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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to §78-2a-3 (2) (c), Utah Code Annotated.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from a final Judgment and Order
of the Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, entered by the
Honorable L. H. Griffiths, dated December 15, 1988.
The Court granted Judgment against the Plaintiff
pursuant to the Defendant's Counterclaim in the sum of $3,264.00.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

II.

III.

IV.

Did the trial Court err in apparently determining
that the payments made were from the separate funds of
William Gregg and did not come from Karen who was fully
obligated to pay on the note to Utah State Credit Union.
Did the trial Court err by failing to categorize the
payments to Utah State Credit Union as voluntary payments
under 11 USC §524 (f).
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial Court correctly
determined the payments made to Utah State Credit Union
were from the separate funds of William Gregg and that
these payments were not voluntary payments within the
meaning of §524 (f), did the trial Court use the wrong
measure for computing damages.
Did the trial Court err by failing to make written
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support its
decision.

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
11 USC §524 (a) A discharge in a case under this title-(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the
extent that such judgment is a determination of the
personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt
discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of
this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived;
(2) operates an an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or
an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge
of such debt is waived; and
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or
an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against,
property of the debtor of the kind specified in section
541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the
commencement of the case, on account of any allowable
community claim, except a community claim that is excepted
from discharge under section 523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1)
of this title, or that would be so excepted, determined in
accordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and
523(d) of this title, in a case concerning the debtor's
spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the petition
in the case concerning the debtor, whether or not discharge
of the debt based on such community claim is waived.
11 USC §524 (c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the
debtor, the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is
based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this
title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of
such debt is waived, only if-(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the
discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this
title;
(2) such agreement contains a clear and
statement which advises the debtor that the
be rescinded at any time prior to discharge
days after such agreement is filed with the
whichever occurs later, by giving notice of
the holder of such claim;
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conspicuous
agreement may
or within sixty
court,
rescission to

(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and
if applicable, accompanied by a declaration of an
affidavit of the attorney that represented the debtor
during the course of negotiating an agreement under this
subsection, which states that such agreement-(A) represents a fully informed and voluntary
agreement by the debtor; and
(B) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor.
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any
time prior to discharge or within sixty days after such
agreement is filed with the court, which occurs later, by
giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim;
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section
have been complied with; and
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not
represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating
an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such
agreement as-(i) not imposing an under hardship on the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent
that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real
property.
11 USC §524 (d) In a case concerning an individual, when the
court has determined whether to grant or not to grant a
discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this
title, the court may hold a hearing at which the debtor shall
appear in person. At any such hearing, the court shall
inform the debtor that a discharge has been granted or the
reason why a discharge has not been granted. If a discharge
has been granted and if the debtor desires to make an
agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this
section, then the court shall hold a hearing at which the
debtor shall appear in person and at such hearing the court
shall-(1) inform the debtor-(A) that such an agreement is not required under
this title; under nonbankruptcy law, or under any
agreement not made in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (c) of this section; and
3

(B) of the legal effect and consequences of-(i) an agreement of the kind specified in
subsection (c) of this section; and
(ii) a default under such an agreement.
(2) determine whether the agreement that the debtor
desires to make complies with the requirements of
subsection (c) (6) of this section, if the consideration
for such agreement is based in whole or in part on a
consumer debt that is not secured by real property of the
debtor.
11 USC §524 (f) Nothing contained in subsection (c) or (d) of
this section prevents a debtor from voluntarily repaying any
debt.
§78-2a-3 (2) (c), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953,
Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective January 1, 1988].
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(c) appeals from the circuit courts.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Prior to August, 1985, Respondents
several

loans

from

hereinafter MUSCUM) .

Appellant

(Utah

State

(Greggs) secured
Credit

Union,

One of the loans was secured by a Fiat

automobile and Honda Motorcycle.

(Transcript p. 2)

On August 9, 1985, the Greggs filed a petition in
bankruptcy.

Mrs. Gregg failed to attend the First Meeting of

Creditors and, consequently, her petition was dismissed.
Gregg was granted a discharge on November 22, 1985.

Mr.

(Transcript

p. 30)
During the intervening period between the filing of the
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petitions for bankruptcy and Mr. Gregg's discharge, they both
signed a new Note with USCU for $6,686.96.

This Note was a

rewrite of the loans the Greggs had outstanding prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petitions.
both Mr. and Mrs. Gregg.

The Note was signed by

However, no Reaffirmation Agreement

was ever executed or approved by the Bankruptcy Court.

The

Greggs1 purpose in signing the Note was to retain the collateral, the car and motorcycle, which they had previously pledged.
The Greggs made payments on the Note until approximately March
1987, after which they refused to make any additional payments.
The

collateral

was

subsequently

repossessed

and

sold.

(Transcript p. 31)
After the sale of the vehicles, USCU instituted suit
against the Greggs to recover the balance due after the sale of
the collateral.

(Transcript p. 2)

Upon discovery by USCU that Mr. Gregg had been discharged in bankruptcy from this particular debt he was dropped
as a party to the action.

A few days prior to the trial itself,

Mrs. Gregg again filed bankruptcy and as of this moment any
actions relating to Mrs. Gregg are stayed pending the outcome of
that bankruptcy.

(Transcript p. 3)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Karen

and William

Gregg

borrowed

money

from USCU.

Finding they were unable to meet their commitments, Mr. Gregg
filed bankruptcy.

Desiring to retain their collateral, the

Greggs signed a new note with USCU.
5

Now, having wasted the

collateral and having had the benefit of its use for over a
year and a half, the Greggs want their money back.
Payments made by Karen Gregg, or with her funds, are
clearly not refundable because the new note was a valid debt as
to her.

For that reason, the Greggs have attemped to create

the fiction that although both Karen and William bring home
approximately the same amount of income and pool their money in
a joint bank account, the payments to USCU were from William
Gregg's separate funds.
Such a determination is contrary to both the facts and
the law.

The facts show that such a separation is irrational

and inequitable.

The law shows that once the funds are placed

in a joint bank account they are the joint funds of the account
owners, William and Karen Gregg.
Even were such a separation possible, William Gregg
would not be entitled to a refund, because the payments made
would be voluntary payments to USCU to forestall repossession of
the collateral or suit against his wife.

Mr. Gregg had no

obligation under the new note as he was discharged in bankruptcy and no reaffirmation agreement was executed.

Mrs. Gregg

could at any time, as she did prior to the trial, file again for
bankruptcy and likewise step out from liability.

Where payments

are made to security lien holders to retain collateral they are
considered voluntary repayments.
Finally, even if the lower court had been correct in
determining the Greggs deserve a refund of money from USCU, the
amount, as a matter of law and equity, should be reduced by the
6

amount of benefit received by the Greggs to prevent a windfall.
In this instance, that amount should take into account the
depreciation of the collateral while it was driven for a year
and a half by the Greggs.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
A REFUND OF ANY MONEY PAID BY APPELLANT.
A.

Karen Gregg Was Fully Obligated
To Make Payments On The Loan.

In William Gregg's schedule of income and expenditures
filed with his bankruptcy petition (Exhibit

ff M

A ) , he claimed

average monthly income consisting of take-home pay for himself
of $1,000.00 and for his wife, $700.00.

The money earned from

these activities was pooled in a joint bank account.

Upon such

pooling, both Greggs became joint owners of the funds so deposited.
Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2dl7, 439 P.2d 468.
(1968).

Any money paid into such a joint account is therefore

the joint property of both.

Therefore, Mr. Gregg's claim that

he paid the money from separate funds is totally inaccurate.
It would be inequitable and totally impractical to require a
lender to try and identify the actual source of joint funds
once it has been commingled in the joint account.

Peterson v.

Peterson, 571 P2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1977).
Because Karen Gregg's

first bankruptcy petition was

dismissed, she was fully obligated to make payments on the note
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up until the time she filed her second petition a day or two
before the trial.

The Greggs conceived the fiction that her

obligation could be avoided if they simply claimed that the
money came from William's separate funds.
simply cannot be supported.

This proposition

The money came from joint funds and

both parties received the benefits of the continued use of the
collateral.

While they were using the collateral they had the

responsibility to keep up the payments.

To now rule that they

are entitled to a refund would be totally inequitable and result
in substantial injustice to USCU.
B.

All Payments Were Voluntary Payments
Permitted By 11 USC §524 (f).

USCU concedes that the Note signed by William Gregg was
not a valid Reaffirmation Agreement as set forth in 11 USCA,
Section 524.

However, 11 USC, Section 524 (f) provides that

nothing in the provisions relating to reaffirmations [Section
524 (c) and (d)] prevents a debtor from voluntarily repaying any
debt.

While Section 524 (c) and Section 524 (d) preclude USCU

from taking any affirmative action against William to enforce
the new note, they do not preclude it from accepting voluntary
payments from William or from proceeding normally to collect the
account from Karen.
Even if it could be shown that the money paid to USCU
was from the separate funds of William Gregg, his choice to pay
that money in order to continue to use the collateral and to
preclude suit against his wife is a voluntary payment as set

8

forth in Section 524 (f). He would, therefore, not be entitled
to demand his money back, especially after having enjoyed the
benefit and use of the collateral for over a year and a half.
In In Re Klapp, 80 B.R. 540 (Bkrtcy W.D. Okl. 1987),
debtors held a mortgage which secured a debt previously discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding.

In regard to that debt, the

Court found:
. . . no reaffirmation agreement of the debt under 11
USC, Section 524 (c) was filed or otherwise entered
into and a discharge was subsequently granted the
debtors.
Debtors nevertheless continued to make, and
objecting creditors continued to accept, monthly debt
service payments in accordance with the provisions of
the Promissory Note. (In Re Klapp, page 541)
The Court was then faced with determining what these
payments constituted.

The Court found:

. . . the Court has previously noted that objecting
creditors accepted payments in excess of $8,000.00
between the date debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition
and February, 1987, allocating such payments to
principal and interest as though the debt was reaffirmed, even though no such reaffirmation was ever
filed. Under 11 USC Section 524 (a) the discharge in
debtor's Chapter 7 case operated as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of any
action, the employment of process or any act to
collect, recover or offset any debt discharged as a
personal liability the debtor. With this in mind,
objecting creditors must be assumed to have treated
the post-discharge payments as voluntary payments by
debtor, which is permitted by Section 524 (f).
In Re Klapp at 544.
In In Re Klapp, there was no obligation on the part of
the creditors

to return the money voluntarily paid by the

debtors.
To like affect was the finding of the Court in In Re
Whitaker, 85B.R.788 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Tenn. 1988).
9

In Whitaker the

debtors owned an automobile upon which the bank had a perfected
security interest.

Debtors continued to make payments on the

automobile following their filing for bankruptcy.

The debtors

neither sought to redeem the automobile from the lien of the
bank nor to negotiate a reaffirmation of terms with the bank.
Debtors

hoped

that

by

continuing

post-petition payments under

to

make

voluntary

the terms of the pre-petition

secured obligation they would be entitled to retain possession
of the car in accordance with the agreement.
The Court found that the payments by the debtors were
voluntary post-petition payments under Section 524 (f). It also
found that debtors were not entitled to retain possession of the
automobile

after

filing

bankruptcy.

The

Court

apparently

allowed the creditors to retain the payments made by the debtor
in spite of the fact that no valid reaffirmation agreement was
executed between the parties.
These cases are similar to the instant case in that they
both reflect post-petition payments of debts secured with a
valid security interest where no valid reaffirmation agreement
was signed by the parties and submitted to the Court.

In fact,

the only difference between the instant case and Whitaker is
that in the instant case debtors were allowed to retain the use
of the collateral whereas in Whitaker the Bankruptcy Court
approved the repossession of the property against the wishes of
the debtors.
Furthermore, there was no evidence of undue influence or
coercion on the part of USCU to force the Greggs to make the
10

payments after William's bankruptcy.

The only undue influence

even claimed by the Greggs is that "the creditor here was in a
much-substantially

stronger bargaining position in terms of

applying some leverage and pressure."

(Transcript, p. 36).

Certainly there was some "leverage" held by USCU, i.e., make
payments

or

turn

over

the

collateral.

This,

however, is

certainly not undue influence or coercion as USCU is simply
asserting the rights given to it as a secured creditor under the
Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, the payments made were "voluntary payments"
and USCU has every right to keep them under 11 USC §524 (f).

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT USED THE WRONG
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DAMAGES.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court were to determine
that the payments made on the new Note to USCU were made from
the separate funds of Mr. Gregg and further that those payments
were made in violation of 11 USC, Section 524 (c), the standard
for

determining

the

damages

used

by

the

trial

Court was

inappropriate.
The trial Court awarded Mr. Gregg the full amount of all
payments made on the new Note.

However, the correct standard

in cases where the debtor has retained possession of collateral
and

continued

to

make

payments

based

on

an

invalid

reaffirmation agreement is set forth in In Re Kendrick, 75 B.R.
451 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ga. 1987).
In Kendrick the Court found that the creditor, the bank,
11

had used undue influence and coercion to require the debtor to
execute

a new Note which was

pre-petition debts to the bank.

a consolidation

of all his

As collateral for this new

Note, the debtor pledged his car upon which the bank already had
a valid security interest.

In ordering the bank to return to

the debtor all payments it had received in excess of the value
of the automobile on the date the bankruptcy petition had been
filed the Court reasoned:
. the bank was entitled to surrender of the
vehicle or payment of its value. Debtor has retained
possession and the benefits of the vehicle and never
returned or tendered return of the vehicle. It would
be inequitable to permit debtor to retain the benefits
of the continued possession and use of the vehicle.
(Kendrick, page 456)
When

he

filed

his

bankruptcy, Mr. Gregg

completed

schedule A-2 (Exhibit B) , designating those creditors holding
security interests in certain properties.

On this schedule,

Mr. Gregg listed USCU as having a security interest in the Fiat
automobile and the Honda motorcyle.
items on that date as

The market value of these

shown on Gregg's

schedules

totaled

$3,200.00.

Upon sale of the secured property USCU received

$1,125.00.

As per the holding in Kendrick, USCU would then be

entitled

to

receive

additional

amounts

up

to

the

sum of

$2,075.00, which is in effect the depreciation in the value of
the collateral from the date of bankruptcy filing up to the
time of repossession.

Therefore, the total judgment should not

have exceeded $1,164.00 plus defendant's costs in the sum of
$25.00, for a total judgment of $1,189.00.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS DECISION.
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reqiiires that
M

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an

advisory jury, the Court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon."
No findings of fact or conclusions of law were made by
the Court in this matter.

"Failure to find upon all material

issues raised by the pleadings is reversible error."

LeGrand

Johnson Corp. v Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 120 P.2d 615 (1966).
Since no waiver of the findings and conclusions was
made by the parties

in this action, the decision must be

reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Boyer Co v.

Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial Court erred
in awarding Judgment against the Plaintiff for the following
reasons:
(1) Karen Gregg was fully obligated to continue to make
payments on the note and the proposition that the payments were
made

solely

from William Gregg's

separate

funds

cannot be

supported by the law or facts of this case.
(2)

USCU

had

every

right

to

continue

to

accept

voluntary payments after William's discharge pursuant to 11 USC
§524 (f).
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(3)

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Appellant was

not entitled to accept the payments, USCU was entitled to be
compensated for the depreciation of the vehicles from the date
of

the

bankruptcy

petition

until

the

time

they

were

repossessed.
(4)

The Court failed to make Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law as required by law.
Appellant, therefore, respectfully requests that the
Judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed and that this Court
award Appellant costs and such other relief as is appropriate.
Respectfully Submitted this

m—day

of July, 1989.
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SCHEDULE OF C E R E N T INCOME AND C U P ^ N T EXPENDITURES
William Gregg and Karen Gregg

L A H I IJI |

A

Name of Debtor.
INCOME

EXPENSES
ESTIMATED AVERAGE FUTURE MONTH.Y EXPENSES Of DEBTOR (NOT INCLUDING
DEBTS TO BE PAID UNDER A PLAN UNDER CHAPTER 11 OR CHAPTER 13 Of THE
• ANKKUPTCY CODE) CONSISTING O f
RENT 0 * NOME LOAN PAYMENT
JINCLUDE LOT RENTED FOR MOBILE HOME»
UTILITIES

*

DEBTOR S TAXI HOME PAY (PER MONTH)

J1U.UU

55.00
.00
75 00
32 .00

ELECTRICITY S
WATER S
MEAT S
TELEPHONE S

GIVE ESTIMATED AVERAGE FUTURE MONTHLY INCOME CONSISTS

t

1,000.
700.

SPOUSE S TAXE HOME PAY (PER MONTH)
REGULAR INCOME AVAJLABLE FROM
OPERATION OF BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

OTHER S

162.00

TOTAL UTi^rTlES

DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ALIMONY OR SUPPORT PAYMENTS'
IF SO STATE MONTHLY AMOUNT
J .

350.00

THE NAME AGE 1 RELATIONSHIP TO YOU Of PERSONS
FOR WHOSE BENEFIT PAYMENTS ARE RECEIVED

50.00

CLOTHING

25.00

LAUNDRY 1 CLEANING
/
INCLUDING
\
NEWSPAPERS PERIODICALS I BOOKS ^SCHOOL BOOKS/

15.00

DOCTOR 4 MEDICAL EXPENSES

30.00

(NO* WClLfO'*G Al/'O »*rw*NTS TO IE »AlO
TRANSPORTATION V«Ot* » »IAN U * 0 € « c « * * * t » i» 0« O * '
TE« U 0» TH£ » A X * » U » T C * COOii

PENSION SOCIAL SECJ«rY 0 « RETIREMENT INCOME

150.00

.0

OTHER MONTHLY INCOME

75.00

RECREATION CLUB I ENTERTAINMENT

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME

INSURANCE (NOT DEDUCTED FROM WAGES
AUTO S .
LIFE S .

OTHER *

S.

17.50
.00

TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES t 1 r 1

Q

1$ Y 7 0 0 0

3 . 50

Motorcycle 9.00
26.50

^ TOTAL I N S T A N C E
NOT DEDUCTED FROM WAGES OR
INCLUOED IN HOME LOAN PAYMENTS
IF YOU PAY OR ARE LIABLE FOR PAYMENT
Of ALIMONY OR SUPPORT PAYMENTS
STATE MONTHLY AMOUNT

TAXES

I

.00

J

.00

AMT Of PAYMENT TO
THE T R U S T E (K ADDI.(_»D*
une«f C * * p i « ' 13 Pvin)
I .

n/a

TOTAL Of EXPENSES AND
PLAN PAYMENT |« Appl.CAWt)

THE NAME AGE 1 RELATIONSHIP TO YOU O* PERSONS FOR
WHOSE BENEFIT PAYMENTS ARE MADE
DIFFERENCE (* Apol.ca&i*
Ucio«f C»*pttf 13 Pun)

S.

DEPENDENTS
NUMBER AGE I Rl LAnONSHlP Of DEPENDENTS (EXCEPT CURRENT S*

Asnley Marie Gregg age 7, daugnter
Miscy Lee Gregg, age 4, daugncer.

.00

PAYMENTS FOR SUPPORT Of ADDfTlONAL
DEPENDENTS NOT LIVING AT YOUR HOME

.00
OTHER (EXPLAIN)

TOTAL ESTIMATED FUTURE MONTHLY EXPENSES

t

1,193.50

C O M P E X U m O N PAJD OR PWQMHED TO ATTO^XET FOR DEBTOR
HAVE YOU PAIO OR AGREED TO PAY (O-a TRANSFIRED OR AGREED TO TRANSFER ANY P R O ^ R T T ) TO YOUR ATTORNEY FOR SERVICES IN CONNECTION WTT
CASE OTHER THAN AGREEING TO PAY SJCH COMPENSATION AS M A Y BE ALLOWED BY THE COURT TO BE PA.O BY THE TRUSTEE FROM MONIES PAJO TO TXE T
FOR Y O U * ACCOUNT?
YES D
NO Q ^
IF THE ANSWER IS YES STATE THE NATJ«*E AND THE AMOUNT Of COMPENSATION PAJD OR PROMISED AND THE SOURCE Of TM£ PAYMENT
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Schedule A-2 — Creditors holding

security

Speeif) w h e n el u m was incurred a n d
the
consideration
therefor,
when
( h m i is t o m m g e m , u n l u j u i d ited
N l M U o ( l I( ( l l l o l l i u l U S I l l c i K C Ol p i UC D c s u i p n o n o( s u u m y a n d d itc w h e n
M u t k t l value
d i s p u t e d subject to seiuli evidenced
of business (il u n k n o w n so state), in
o b t a i n e d by c i c d n o r
by a j u d g m e n t , negotiable instru
elude z i p code
m e n t , or other w r i t i n g , or incurred as
p a i t n e r or joint c o n t r i e t o r , so in
die ne specify name o f m y partner or
j o i n t contractor o n m y debt

UCcih S t a t e E m p l o y e e ' s C r e d i t Unio
660 South 2nd Last
S t l t Kike C i t y , Utah 84145-0001

Automobile,

1978 l i a L

U t a h S t a t e L m p l o y e e ' s C i e d i t Unio
660 S o u t h 2nd I n n l
S a l t l a k e C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 4 5 - 0 0 0 1

1984 Honda Magna

Rally

Motorcycle

I n c l i n e d ApL J1 1 9 8 3 , p u r c h a s e
of a u t o m o b i l e

Inclined

hily

1984,

purchase

| $1,000.00

2,200.00

A m o u n t o f claim
w i t h o u t deduc
tion o f value
o f security

$873.00

2,734.16

S
ex?

Total

J

3,200.00

j

3,607.16

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT: With regards now to the Credit Union
vs. Gregg matter.

Do you wish to make an opening statement?

MR. KENT: We could probably help the Court out a
little bit on this.

The—let me explain where we're at on

this.
Mr. Gregg had filed bankruptcy, a Chapter 7
bankruptcy in 1985. After that time—I guess at the same
time, his wife also filed bankruptcy.

The wife apparently

didn't show up at the first meeting of creditors, her
bankruptcy was dismissed, and the—and a bankruptcy discharge
was entered on behalf of Mr. Gregg in this case.

That was

in November of 1985, I believe, that discharge was granted.
Just a week or so before that, the time the
discharge was granted, they had these folks in, -the credit
union did, and they re-signed some papers. What it was was
a consolidation of three previous loans that Mr. Gregg had
had.

There was a signature loan, actually tv/o signature

loans, a loan for a motorcycle, and a loan for a car.

Both

Mrs. Gregg and Mr. Gregg signed those documents.
There was not any reaffirmation agreement approved
by the United States Bankruptcy Court, and this was being a
reaffirmation of a debt owed by Mr. Gregg.

I filed suit

after being advised by my client that the loan had gone
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delinquent•

I was immediately notified by a pro se answer

from the defendant that he filed bankruptcy and the debt
had been discharged and that he had never signed any
reaffirmation.

Shortly after that, I was also contacted by

Mr. Gillman on behalf of the defendants.
I subsequently filed my own motion to dismiss the
matter as against Ilr. Gregg, being fully aware of the fact
that without our signed reaffirmation, court-approved
reaffirmation, we had no right to proceed against him to
collect on a debt that was discharged in the bankruptcy.
That still left Mrs, Gregg as a defendant in the
action.

Mr. Gregg, Mr. Gillman on his behalf, filed a

counterclaim against the credit union, claiming that the
monies v/hich had been paid pursuant to the reaffirmation on
his part and simply a renegotiation of a loan with Mrs. Gregg|
he claimed that he was entitled to have that money back,
indicating and claiming in his counterclaim that those
monies were paid because he was under the assumption that he
had a legal and binding reaffirmation agreement, so he paid
those monies.
He's now asked for some $4,70C back, claims that he
ought to have that back.

Said that all the payments that

were made v/ere made by him personally and that his wife
didn't make any of those payments, so he wants his money
back, Mrs. Gregg filed bankruptcy last week, so we're not

A-4

on August 9 of 1985, the Greggs filed a petition in bankruptcy.

At the 341 meeting of creditors, Mrs. Gregg, for

reasons that are probably not relevant to this proceeding,
failed to appear and the natter was bifurcated, bifurcated
by the bankruptcy court and the natter dismissed as to her.
I think there's no dispute that following that
time, I think that the note that is now in evidence will
reflect that the defendants signed the note at different
times, I think one was October 10 and one signed on October
19, but in anyevent, the new note was signed.
MR. KENT:
one second?

Lxcuse m e .

Can I interrupt for just

Just to make something clear, I'm sorry to

interrupt. Me9re

not dismissing the case against firs. Gregg
We d o n f t know what's going

at this time, it's just stayed.
to happen with her bankruptcy.

Ue have dismissed against

tor. Gregg.
MR. GILL13\:i:
THE COURT:
19th?

And that's correct.

I look at t h a t — i s it the 17th or the

It's a JLitcle hard to see there on that, the date

that M r s . Gregg signed that note.
KR. GILLMAN:

I thought it was the 19th.

The

Court may be correct, I'm not s u r e —
THh COURT:

It's looks like it was 11 and then she

made a seven out of it, but she may have tried to be a 19,
I just was wondering.

-30-
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MR. GILLMA1J;

I'm not sure that it makes a great

deal o f —
THL COURT;

It doesn't make a lot of difference.

Go ahead.
MR. GILLKA1I: — o f difference, really.

Certainly,

the signatures occurred prior to the date of the entry of
the discharge, which I believe was November 22nd of 1985.
The new note, as I think has been stipulated, was
a consolidation of all the pre-petition dischargeable debts
and was signed in order to allow fir. Gregg to keep possessiorj
of the motor vehicles which he was trying to use in
connection with his job.

The new note was the total sum of

$6,686.96, as appears on the exhibit.
From about 30 days after that, the Fiat was
inoperable.

The time of year it was, I suppose the

motorcycle was not usable, it was very cold, and it was put
into storage.
Mrs. Gregg herself made no payments on that
obligation.

She maintains self-employment in the home as a

child care provider.

hhe isn't even a licensed driver. She

had no need for the vehicles.
The Greggs were called into the credit union, this
note was presented to them, they were never properly
advised of their rights.

The simple fact of the matter is,

as a reaffirmation agreement, it is invalid, and the

31.
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bearing, maybe they weren't in this case, but certainly as in
most cases, the creditor here was in a much—substantially
stronger bargaining position in terms of applying some
leverage and pressure, youfve got a debtor out there, a
couple of vehicles, he'd like to have them, you've got to
reaffirm there's—in order to keep these vehicles.

There

was no relation, as far as we can see, to the amount of the
new note the actual value of the vehicles.

The new note

was for in excess of $6,000.
Once the vehicles were repossessed a fairly short
time later, one was worth nothing and the other one was worthl
$1,150.

1 think there's clear over-reaching on the part of

the credit union in this situation and to allow them to keep
this sum of money simply because 2*rs. Gregg had signed this
note also and they could have tried to collect from her,
would, because of the practical effect of the thing, be a
complete violation of congressional policy and intent of
this statute, and we think under the laws we've cited to the
Court that this defendant is entitled to refund of that sum.
And again, the 1,150 should be theirs, because
we don't dispute the validity of the security agreement.
THi- COURT;

Thank you.

>:r. Kent?
IJR. K A N T :

The statute that Mr. Cillran has not

referred the Court to is contained in 11 U.L3.C.S. Section

JJL
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